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“It isn’t for the few to tell the many what is true” Understanding the relationship between commonsensical thinking and populism| title | “It isn’t for the few to tell the many what is true” Understanding the relationship between commonsensical thinking and populism |
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| start_date | 2024/02/12 |
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| schedule | 14h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Salle A2 201 |
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| summary | Populist objections to science are under increasing scrutiny by academic research. Different authors (Mede and Schäfer, 2020; Bellolio, 2022) suggest that the populist hostility to science is multidimensional phenomenon encompassing both moral (i.e., scientists form a untrustworthy corrupt elite trusted) and epistemological elements (i.e., the everyday knowledge of the people is the main way to understand the world). So far, the research has been focusing on moral criticisms and the relationship between populism and conspiracy thinking (Mancosu et al. 2017; Giorgi and Eslen-Ziya, 2022). While the epistemic component and notably commonsensical thinking (Saurette and Gunster, 2011), that is an epistemology that values popular and practical knowledge as a legitimate (and often superior) form of epistemic cognition, is less studied. In this paper we rely on original data from a survey conducted in five countries (Brazil, Germany, Hungary, Spain, the UK) to analyze the antecedents of commonsensical thinking and its relationship with two different subdimensions of populist attitudes (anti-elitism and people sovereignty). Our results show that 'common sense' is consistently associated with people sovereignty while its relationship with anti-elitism varies across countries. |
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| responsibles | NC |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2024/02/08 17:03 UTC |
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