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Credible Threats| title | Credible Threats |
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| start_date | 2024/05/24 |
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| schedule | 11h15-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Salle 114 |
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| summary | We study the effect of communication on deterrence and costly punishment. We show that a theoretical model of belief-dependent anger captures the relationship between messages, beliefs, and behavior and implies that threats can generate credible commitments. We test our model in a between-subjects experiment with belief elicitation where one-sided communication is available as a treatment. The evidence supports the theory, demonstrating that communicated threats change beliefs and payoff expectations and lead to greater rates of costly punishment. Threats successfully deter co-players from exploiting the strategic environment to their advantage. **** Joint with Flora Li & Alec Smith. |
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| responsibles | Le Lec, Pejsachowicz |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2024/05/23 11:06 UTC |
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