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How (not) to prove cryptographic security against quantum attacks| title | How (not) to prove cryptographic security against quantum attacks |
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| start_date | 2024/03/26 |
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| schedule | 11h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Salle 3052 |
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| summary | Perhaps one of the most spectacular feats of quantum computers is the ability to break (public-key) cryptosystems that are used to secure the Internet. This directly motivates the study of cryptography that is secure against quantum attacks, namely post-quantum cryptography.
In this talk, I will focus on the following basic question: how do we prove that a cryptographic construction is secure against quantum attacks? I will highlight a perhaps surprising distinction between the security of cryptographic constructions against quantum attacks, and the quantum hardness of the underlying problems that are used to reason about security. Doing so will highlight a natural connection to cryptographic proofs of quantumness.
Based on joint work with Alex Lombardi, Ethan Mook, and Daniel Wichs. |
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| responsibles | Hamoudi |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2024/03/21 15:26 UTC |
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