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Assertion and the Meaning of Mood| old_uid | 134 |
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| title | Assertion and the Meaning of Mood |
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| start_date | 2005/11/04 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | A knowledge account of assertion will be defended, where knowledge is to be understood in constructivist terms (contra Timothy Williamson). The meaning of the declarative sentence, called the assertion-candidate, is defined by what one must know in order to be entitled to assert it. Both a cognitive notion (‘to know’) and a pragmatic notion (‘to assert’) are thus part of the definition of the assertion-candidate. The assertion-candidate, and thus the meaning of mood, is not explained in terms of actual force (contra Dummett), but in terms of potential force. It is thus possible to answer Davidson’s criticism towards a theory of mood that is given in terms of force. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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