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Memory and Temporal Awareness| old_uid | 990 |
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| title | Memory and Temporal Awareness |
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| start_date | 2006/03/31 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Memories, like other mental states such as beliefs or perceptual experiences, are intentional states. Memories have content. The aim of this essay is to investigate how we should construe the content of memories. What sorts of things do memories put us in cognitive contact with? Are they, as our verbal reports often suggest, events in the outside world? Are they mental events?
First, I will highlight one phenomenal property of memories that will constrain the task of determining what the content of memories is like: When a subject remembers something, the remembered event is presented to her as happening in the past. Next, I will discuss a few proposals about mnemonic content that attempt to capture this feature of memories. Then, I will offer an alternative that builds on some remarks by John Searle on the ‘causal self-referentiality’ of memory. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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