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Neo-neo-Gricean pragmatics| old_uid | 1276 |
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| title | Neo-neo-Gricean pragmatics |
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| start_date | 2006/05/19 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | esc. B, 3e étage, salle W |
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| details | attention au changement de lieu |
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| summary | A large part of the recent literature on scalar implicature is dominated by two opposing schools of thought. On the one hand, attempts are being made at shoehorning scalar implicature into the grammar (Chierchia, Landman). On the other hand, several authors have made proposals for formalising and generalising established neo-Gricean approaches à la Horn and Levinson (Sauerland, Spector, van Rooij and Schulz). It is with the latter developments that I align myself.
In this talk I will first outline what I take to be the key tenets of the neo-neo-Gricean approach, and present various kinds of evidence that argue in its favour, including new experimental data. In the second half of the talk, I turn to what is said. Following its eponym, neo-neo-Griceanism assumes that implicatures are based on what the speaker "says" by proffering an utterance. There has been a lot of discussion of this notion, especially amongst philosophers, but it is widely agreed that what is said comes in sentence-sized units; what is said is basically sentence meaning with bells and whistles. I argue that this assumption has to be relinquished. The "extent" of what is said is variable: it may correspond to sub-sentential expressions (e.g. verb phrases or relative clauses), but also to supra-sentential aggregates (paragraphs). The empirical evidence for this claim is of various kinds, and includes embedded implicatures, conditional perfection, symmetric readings of universal quantfiers, and free choice permission |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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