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Belief, Knowledge, Sentences and Propositions| old_uid | 1668 |
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| title | Belief, Knowledge, Sentences and Propositions |
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| start_date | 2006/10/27 |
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| schedule | 11-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Developments in reasoning about knowledge have picked up pace since the fundamental work of Jaakko Hintikka and David Lewis. A great deal of purely technical work has since come out of IBM, CUNY, Indiana, Amsterdam, and other places.
However, some philosophical issues like the justification of knowledge go back to Plato and have recently received impetus since the work of Gettier, resulting in much activity in epistemology. Issues about belief go back at least to Frege, and the nature of belief is another active area. Finally, starting with Aumann’s work, there has been much activity in Game theory which is related to the issues of knowledge and common knowledge. We will try to give a bird’s eye view of some of these developments, and also say something about what it is that we know or believe, whether it is sentences or propositions; and if the latter, what they are. This will give us some insight into the thorny problem of logical omniscience. Ultimately our (somewhat Wittgensteinian) view is that these notions like belief, knowledge, and common knowledge must be firmly grounded in human activity, both at the personal level (where notions like (subjective) probability, or the maximization of utility arise) and at the group level where issues of common knowledge, co-ordination, levels of knowledge, and judgment aggregation arise. |
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| responsibles | Stojanovic |
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