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On the Logic of constitutive Norms| old_uid | 2154 |
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| title | On the Logic of constitutive Norms |
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| start_date | 2007/01/29 |
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| schedule | 15h30-17h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | According to legal and social theory, normative systems of high complexity, such as legal systems or institutional ones, consist of regulative as well as non-regulative components. That is, they do not only regulate existing forms of behavior (e.g., "it ought to be the case that", etc.), but they specify and create such forms (e.g., "signing this document counts as giving your informed consent").
Since the publication of the first paper in deontic logic (Von Wright, 1951), much research has been devoted to the study of the formal aspects of regulative rules (also known as conditional norms), giving rise to a considerable amount of literature. Attention from researchers in logic to the second type of rules is instead only one decade old.
The talk addresses the issue of constitutive rules by making use of modal logic techniques. The formal analysis will be gradually built upon inputs from legal and social theory and will proceed semantically. The presentation of these results will be sided by some methodological considerations about the application of logic to concept analysis. In particular, the difference between semantics-driven and axiomatics-driven approaches to concept analysis will be stressed. Depending on time, I will also relate the systems presented to logics studied in the tradition of epistemic logic pointing at some formal similarities. |
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| responsibles | Bonnay, Sandu |
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