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Identity and Individuality in Physics| old_uid | 2381 |
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| title | Identity and Individuality in Physics |
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| start_date | 2007/03/09 |
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| schedule | 14h |
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| online | no |
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| details | séminaire organisé dans le cadre du projet ANR blanc « Foundphys » |
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| summary | A ‘reductionist’ account of individuality, equating it with qualitative difference, holds for everyday objects and in classical mechanics. However, it does not hold for indistinguishable particles in quantum mechanics. As a consequence, it seems necessary to either take the individuality of quantum particles as a primitive metaphysical fact, or to give up the idea that the basic ‘building blocks’ of reality truly are individuals. The former alternative is usually looked at with suspicion on the basis of allegedly indispensable empiricist principles. In this paper, a) I argue that one recent attempt (Saunders 2006) to revive the reductionist account (for fermions) fails. Moreover, b) I show that the reductionist perspective cannot account for non-individual entities. Next, c) I contend that the reductionist view is not as compelling from the empiricist perspective as it is commonly taken to be.. I conclude by d) suggesting one way to make sense of the idea that the individuality of particles is a primitive fact, while also satisfying the intuition that properties are all there is to things. |
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| oncancel | Ajout |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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