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Two Dogmas about Quantum Mechanics| old_uid | 2440 |
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| title | Two Dogmas about Quantum Mechanics |
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| start_date | 2007/03/16 |
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| schedule | 16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle 315 (directions) |
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| summary | I discuss what Pitowsky (2007) has called two 'dogmas' about quantum mechanics. The first dogma is Bell's assertion that measurement should never be introduced as a primitive in a fundamental mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics, but should always be open to a dynamical analysis in principle. The second dogma is the view that the quantum state has an ontological significance analogous to the ontological significance of the classical state (which specifies a complete catalogue of a system's properties), i.e., that the quantum state is a (perhaps incomplete) representation of physical reality. I argue that both dogmas are called into question by a 'no cloning' principle that distinguishes quantum information from classical information. I distinguish two measurement problems: a problem about individual events, which I argue is a pseudo-problem, and a tractable problem about probabilities, which finds a solution in the phenomenon of decoherence. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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