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One round and two round elections : an experimental study| old_uid | 2512 |
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| title | One round and two round elections : an experimental study |
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| start_date | 2007/03/23 |
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| schedule | 10h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | We report on a series of experiments performed in Paris, Lille and Montreal to compare voting rules. The incentive structure is defined by the positions assigned to the subjects (voters) with respect to 5 points called “candidates” on an axis called “political” axis. This is designed to mimic the real political landscape. Subjects vote to elect one of the five candidates. We are interested in comparing voting rules according to both aggregate outcomes (who is elected) and individual behavior (who votes for who). We focus our attention on the two most standard rules, the one-round and two-round systems. At the individual level we find massive non-sincere voting under both systems. At the aggregate level we confirm several theoretical predictions including path dependence effects and the number of candidates who get significant vote shares under these rules. |
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| oncancel | changement d’intervenant |
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| responsibles | Bourgeois-Gironde |
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