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Reconciling Adams' Thesis with Truth-Conditional Semantics?| old_uid | 2718 |
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| title | Reconciling Adams' Thesis with Truth-Conditional Semantics? |
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| start_date | 2007/04/27 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Grande salle |
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| details | La séance aura lieu en liaison avec le cours donné à l'ENS par M. Cozic et P. Egré sur les conditionnels |
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| summary | I argue that the various triviality results for Adams' Thesis - the hypothesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent - fail to disprove it. On the contrary, since it is possible to construct a triviality result for any 'orthodox' theory of conditionals satisfying a much weaker 'Preservation' condition, we should consider abandoning elements of the orthodoxy. I consider a number of possibilities and especially the route taken by McGee, who allows the semantic contents of conditionals to be determined (in part) by agents' subjective probabilities. |
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| responsibles | Bonnay, Sandu |
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