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The Definition of Morality| old_uid | 2772 |
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| title | The Definition of Morality |
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| start_date | 2007/05/09 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| details | remise du prix Jean-Nicod |
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| summary | Debates about the definition of ‘moral judgment’ and ‘moral rule’ have a venerable history in philosophy. In addition to debating the merits of various proposed definitions, philosophers have also disagreed about what the definition is supposed to do: What counts as getting the definition right? One proposal is that moral rules or moral judgments are a psychological natural kind, and that the correct definition should specify the essential features of this kind. Recently, a number of philosophers and psychologists have suggested that research using the moral / conventional task, first introduced by Elliot Turiel, has uncovered some of the essential properties of this natural kind. If the empirical generalizations drawn from this work were correct, it would be reasonable to conclude that we have indeed discovered the essence of morality. However, a growing body of evidence indicates that those generalizations are not correct, and thus that the moral / conventional task tells us nothing of interest about the definition of morality. Another proposal is that the correct definition of morality should capture the concept underlying people’s ordinary use of terms like ‘moral rule’. However, there is reason to suspect that there may be no coherent concept in this area. |
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| responsibles | Bouveresse, Lesguillons |
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