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The Persistence of Moral Disagreement| old_uid | 2800 |
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| title | The Persistence of Moral Disagreement |
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| start_date | 2007/05/11 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | immeuble Rataud, Amphithéâtre |
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| summary | Moral disagreement is widespread. But would that disagreement persist even under hypothetical idealized conditions in which all parties to a moral debate are rational, impartial and fully informed about the relevant non-moral facts? The answer is important for many moral theories. On some versions of theories in the “ideal observer” tradition, a positive answer entails either moral relativism or moral skepticism, and many contemporary moral realists hold that a negative answer would show that moral realism is false. A number of recent empirical studies of moral judgments in different cultural groups suggest that moral disagreement would indeed persist under idealized circumstances, though much turns on exactly how the idealized circumstances are characterized. The persistence of moral disagreement is also suggested by an empirically motivated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying the acquisition and implementation of moral norms, and by theoretical work on how those mechanisms might have evolved. The model proposed for the psychology of norms leaves abundant room for reasoning in moral deliberation, but does not support the idea that rational deliberation will lead to convergence. |
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| responsibles | Bouveresse, Lesguillons |
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