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Mindreading and the folk concept of intentional action| old_uid | 2996 |
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| title | Mindreading and the folk concept of intentional action |
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| start_date | 2007/06/08 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | bât. Danton, 1er étage, salle D 116 |
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| summary | The moral function hypothesis asserts that besides explaining past behavior and predicting future behavior, an additional function of mindreading is to enable people to make moral judgments. Philosophers and psychologists have debated about whether recent experimental findings about the folk concept of intentional action by Josh Knobe, Shaun Nichols, Fiery Cuhsman and others support the moral function hypothesis. It was found that people’s intuitions about the intentional status of side-effects seem to depend on whether these side-effects are morally right or wrong. Some philosophers and psychologists have concluded from this and other findings that the folk concept of intentional action—an important component of mindreading—has been shaped by moral factors. In this talk, I argue that current arguments for and against the moral function hypothesis that are based on these findings are inconclusive for a principled reason. Furthermore, on the basis of a novel interpretation of Knobe’s, Nichols’ and Cushman’s experimental findings, I argue that these findings fail to show that our judgments about intentional status of actions are causally affected by moral considerations. As a result, these findings do not support the moral function hypothesis. Experimental findings in support of this novel interpretation are presented. |
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| oncancel | changt de lieu à partir du 27/04/2007 |
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| responsibles | Stojanovic |
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