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Networks and Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Strategy Selection| old_uid | 3099 |
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| title | Networks and Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Strategy Selection |
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| start_date | 2007/06/26 |
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| schedule | 10 h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle 315 (bibliothèque) |
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| details | http://crea.csregistry.org/CREA20070626Ahn |
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| summary | We report the results of a laboratory experiment in which subjects continuously select whom to play, whether to cooperate with them in repeated 2-person prisoners dilemma games. By manipulating the nature of information exchanged in endogenously-evolving networks, we observe the impact of reputational information on overall payoffs, levels of cooperation, the shape of networks, and the kinds of strategies employed under different information and reputational conditions. Selective networking among cooperators appears to drive the primary dynamic in our experiments, with information providing earlier and greater advantages to nice strategies. Our findings suggest that policy actors tempted to exploit early attempts at creating joint projects are likely to end up ostracized in a defectors’ getto and unable to gain the potential long-term advantages of mutual cooperation—provided that there are enough nice strategies among relevant policy actors to develop the clusters of mutual cooperation that formed in our experiments. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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