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Indirect Reciprocity, Reputation and Competition| old_uid | 3557 |
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| title | Indirect Reciprocity, Reputation and Competition |
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| start_date | 2007/11/30 |
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| schedule | 10h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Effects of reputation-based indirect reciprocity are puzzling from the perspective
of evolutionary biology. Suggested evolutionary explanations are either
vulnerable to invasion by players who strategically build a reputation, or
demand information processing ability of players that appears to be unrealistic,
or require complicated patterns of interaction. Nevertheless, the existence of
indirect reciprocity based on reputation has been documented in a number of
recent studies. We propose a comparatively simple mechanism for the
emergency and survival of indirect reciprocity. Specifically, we introduce
competition in an experimental helping game. Following previous experiments,
in this game “donors” can increase the payoffs of “recipients” at a cost to
themselves and donor and recipient roles are assigned independently across
periods. Donors can observe the image score of the recipients, which is the
record of their previous behaviour in the role of a donor. In a baseline treatment,
donors are randomly assigned to recipients as in previous experiments. In the
competition treatment donors can choose which recipient to help, if at all. In
treatments where the image score covers five periods, competition does not affect
average helping rates, but leads to a split in the population. Some players
essentially always help, some essentially never do. If the image score covers only
one period, competition increases average helping rates, apparently since the
transition from a bad to a good score is cheaper. With a long history players can
be stuck with a bad score as the future is too short to reap the benefits of
improving their score. |
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| responsibles | Bourgeois-Gironde |
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