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Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Truth Tracking| old_uid | 3753 |
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| title | Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Truth Tracking |
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| start_date | 2007/12/21 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | The problem of the aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. The difficulty lies in the fact that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such dilemmas as the discursive paradox. So far, three procedures have been proposed to overcome the paradox: the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures on the one hand, and the merging approach on the other hand. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, the question is how good the merging approach is in tracking the truth, and how it compares with the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures. The three procedures are then compared with a Bayesian account of judgment aggregation. Finally, some implications of this work for social epistemology are discussed.
The talk is based on joint work with Gabriella Pigozzi (Luxembourg) and Jan Sprenger (Bonn and Tilburg). Some of the material I will present is contained in our joint paper 'Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation' (downloadable from http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003593/) |
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| responsibles | Drouet, Martin |
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