Collective intentionality from a developmental and comparative point of view

old_uid3837
titleCollective intentionality from a developmental and comparative point of view
start_date2008/01/18
schedule11h-13h
onlineno
location_infosalle des actes
summaryThe development of shared or collective “we” intentionality will be discussed from ontogenetic and comparative points of view. While human infants and other animal species develop some simple second-order intentionality early on, only human infants move from there to develop abilities of collective intentionality. Recent research into the early ontogeny of such collective intentionality in the third and fourth year of life, particularly in the domain of joint play, will be reviewed. The implications of these early competencies (in children who do not yet have a full-fledged theory if mind) for philosophical analyses of shared intentionality will be discussed.
responsiblesStojanovic