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Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model| old_uid | 4511 |
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| title | Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model |
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| start_date | 2008/04/03 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h15 |
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| online | no |
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| details | Travail en commun avec Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and David Schmeidler |
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| summary | A decision maker is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects decisions that are rational in an "objective" sense: the decision maker can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models decisions that are rational in a "subjective" sense: the decision maker cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. We impose axioms on these relations that allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities. It is "objectively rational" to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is "subjectively rational" to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (relative to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. |
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| responsibles | Hill, Cozic |
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