|
Psychological Externalism| old_uid | 4579 |
|---|
| title | Psychological Externalism |
|---|
| start_date | 2008/04/11 |
|---|
| schedule | 11h-13h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| location_info | esc. D, 2e étage, salle Histoire |
|---|
| summary | Semantic externalism has created a great deal of excitement within philosophy of mind. It is widely perceived to have overthrown traditional theories not only of meaning and mental content, but also of the nature of psychological states. Semantic externalism, it is held, supports psychological externalism. I argue that this excitement is unwarranted. Semantic externalism does not have much to teach us about the nature of mental states. Or, rather: The type of semantic externalism that is most plausible, Twin Earth externalism, has no terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind - even on the assumption that the externalist conclusions extends to mental content. I examine some other efforts to employ semantic considerations in support of psychological externalism, but argue that they fail as well. Although widely endorsed, psychological externalism lacks support. |
|---|
| responsibles | Stojanovic |
|---|
| |
|