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The measure of mind| old_uid | 5262 |
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| title | The measure of mind |
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| start_date | 2008/09/12 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | The talk will sketch a measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the sentences by which we attribute them.
On this account, the sentences by which we attribute propositional attitudes function semantically like the sentences by which we attribute a quantity of some physical magnitude (e.g., having a mass of 80 kilos). That is, in much the same way we specify a quantity of some physical magnitude by means of its numerical representative on a measurement scale, we specify a propositional attitude of a given type by means of its representative in a linguistically-defined measurement space. Propositional attitudes turn out to be causally efficacious aptitudes (a kind of disposition) for thought and behavior, not semantically evaluable particulars of some sort. |
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| responsibles | Origgi |
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