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The Perceptual Basis of Demonstrative Reference - Can a Neo-Fregean give us a satisfactory answer on how perception makes thought possible?| old_uid | 6182 |
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| title | The Perceptual Basis of Demonstrative Reference - Can a Neo-Fregean give us a satisfactory answer on how perception makes thought possible? |
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| start_date | 2009/02/04 |
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| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In this talk I will go over my previous Masters' dissertation (2008) and try to give you a few reasons for seeing what is wrong with a Neo-Fregean framework such as Evans' (1982) for grounding the intentionality of thought in perception. I will then briefly hint on a possible way to work on the question in a more naturalist framework, where singularity is conceived in terms of integrated perceptual and cognitive processes with a certain function of orienting the subject towards an object. |
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| oncancel | Horaires exceptionnels |
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| responsibles | El Hady Ba |
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