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Choosing between instinct and reason: the role of metacognition in initiating analytic thinking| old_uid | 6254 |
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| title | Choosing between instinct and reason: the role of metacognition in initiating analytic thinking |
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| start_date | 2009/02/12 |
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| schedule | 11h-12h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Often when making decisions, one or more of the potential choices is suggested by automatic, fast acting heuristic processes.
Advertisers, for example, rely on a sense of familarity to increase the appeal of their products. These initial, intuitive judgments can,
in theory, be overturned by recourse to more reasoned analysis.
However, as the extensive heuristics and biasses literature demonstrates, reasoners often give responses that are consistent with the initial intuition, even though this leads them to neglect relevant principles of prabability and logic. In this talk, I will present data to support the hypothesis that the compellingness of these intuitions can be attributed to a second-order metacognitive judgment, which I will call the Feeling of Rightness. In other words, the initial intuition has two
distinct aspects: the content of the choice delivered to working memory and a judgment about how right that decision feels. It is this latter judgment that determines the probability that more deliberate, analytic processes are engaged. |
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| oncancel | Attention au jour |
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| responsibles | Pélissier |
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