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Can There Be Institutional Virtues?| old_uid | 6651 |
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| title | Can There Be Institutional Virtues? |
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| start_date | 2009/04/03 |
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| schedule | 11h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | We often talk as though groups and collectives of various kinds—teams, appointments panels, juries—can display virtues. We might, for instance, describe a jury as 'fair-minded', or a research team as 'scrupulous'. But what exactly are we doing when we say these things? Are groups and collectives virtuous only insofar as their individual members have the virtue; or is there an irreducibly collective way in which groups can possess virtues? And how do individuals and collectives relate to the possibility of attributing virtues (and indeed vices) to institutions?
I shall adapt Margaret Gilbert's idea of a 'plural subject' to explain how collectives can have virtues, and then explain the possibility of virtuous or vicious institutions in terms of the virtues/vices of the individuals and collectives whose activities realize the procedures that define the institution.
Finally, I shall focus on the political significance of institutional virtues of epistemic justice. Such institutional virtues are revealed as a prerequisite, on at least some conceptions, of liberty and democracy. |
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| oncancel | chgt d’horaire |
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| responsibles | Origgi |
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