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The Role of Inference in the Mentalist Study of Linguistic Semantics| old_uid | 6722 |
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| title | The Role of Inference in the Mentalist Study of Linguistic Semantics |
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| start_date | 2009/04/10 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Largely due to Chomsky's arguments for a shift of the linguist's focus from
E-language to I-language, contemporary linguistics has been increasingly
interested in the mental underpinnings of the human ability for language.
Despite this change of perspective, linguistic semantics is still
approached from an externalist point of view, as this seems to be the only way in which we can isolate some pure core of linguistic meaning that remains unaffected by an individual's subjective beliefs about the world. In this respect, it has often been noted that in order to study I-semantics, we will need to eventually accept that semantic representations should not be separated so rigidly from encyclopaedic knowledge (Chomsky 2000, Jackendoff 2002). Even so, there is currently little input as to how we can approach the integration of personal beliefs in the study of linguistic semantics. In my talk, I will discuss this integration, proposing that it can be directly addressed through the implementation of the relevance-theoretic predictions regarding the inferential processes involved in the interpretation of utterances (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 2002) and suggesting that, under normal circumstances, individuals manage to effortlessly and mechanistically attribute intentionality to their interlocutors because they are genetically endowed with a unique mind-reading ability which allows them to develop an intersubjective, yet genuinely context-dependent, appreciation of linguistic semantics. |
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| responsibles | Stojanovic |
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