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Hyper-Reliability and Apriority| old_uid | 6858 |
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| title | Hyper-Reliability and Apriority |
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| start_date | 2009/05/05 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle Weil |
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| summary | Consider beliefs that are true whenever held: beliefs like (a) "I exist," (b) "I am thinking about myself," and (c) "Jack = Jack." Are such beliefs a priori? In the background reading I argue that they're not. (Participants are encouraged to read those papers, but I won't presume that they've done so.) We'll discuss these issues, focusing especially on the last example. What motivations are there for thinking that thought is a priori? What motivations are there for thinking it entails that Jack exists? Is it possible to remove the existential commitment from the thought? |
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| responsibles | Lesguillons |
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