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Associated reading:
Paul Boghossian, "What the Externalist Can Know A Priori" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997), 161-75. Also appears in
C.Wright, M. Smith and C. Macdonald, eds., (1998) Knowing Our Own Minds:Essays in Self-Knowledge (electronic version will be provided)
My paper, "What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?" <http://www.jimpryor.net/research/papers/McKinsey.pdf> (retitle)| old_uid | 6913 |
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| title | Associated reading:
Paul Boghossian, "What the Externalist Can Know A Priori" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997), 161-75. Also appears in
C.Wright, M. Smith and C. Macdonald, eds., (1998) Knowing Our Own Minds:Essays in Self-Knowledge (electronic version will be provided)
My paper, "What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?" <http://www.jimpryor.net/research/papers/McKinsey.pdf> (retitle) |
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| start_date | 2009/05/12 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | McKinsey's argument challenges the compatibility of externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The challenge goes
like this: I presume to know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection says that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn't have those thoughts unless my environment were a certain way. Hence, it looks like I can conclude, on the basis of introspection and philosophical reflection
alone, that my environment is a certain way---which seems incredible.
Something has to give. We'll explore several ways of defusing this challenge. The solution I prefer will draw on the material introduced in Seminar 1. |
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| responsibles | Lesguillons |
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