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Some Ontological Questions Concerning Space, Time and the Physical World| old_uid | 6935 |
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| title | Some Ontological Questions Concerning Space, Time and the Physical World |
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| start_date | 2009/05/14 |
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| schedule | 16h30-18h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | It is argued that there are interesting cases in which two formal theories
syntactically and semantically non-trivially different in the standard
sense are rather to be classified as only trivially different. For a strict
comparison of the systems of such a kind the generalized concepts of
syntactically and semantically trivial differences are formally defined.
It is then shown that the Cantorian point-based system and the Aristotelian
interval-based system of the linear continuum are just trivially different
in the generalized sense. From an ontological point of view, this means
that neither one-dimensional points nor the regions (the entities of a higher dimension) should be taken as basic elements of space (or time).
Consequently, the crucial ontological question about the structure of the
physical world arises only when we introduce the external one-place
predicate letters denoting physical properties ascribable to the entities
that are supposed to be the basic entities of the physical world. |
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| responsibles | Stojanovic |
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