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Handling uncertainty in auctions and resource allocation| old_uid | 6962 |
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| title | Handling uncertainty in auctions and resource allocation |
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| start_date | 2009/05/15 |
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| schedule | 14h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | There is a huge literature on market mechanisms, providing several auctions types to choose from depending upon your needs. However, in most of these auctions, the issue of uncertainty is rarely addressed. In particular, it is usually assumed that nothing will change from the moment an auction has started until it has been cleared. But in a real scenario, unexpected events could occur (bidders withdrawing their offers, goods becoming unavailable after having been offered, etc.). In such cases, looking for an optimal solution is not always the best option, and it would be better to look for a robust solution that, although being suboptimal, would still be applicable even if unforeseen events happen. In this talk I will present some initial work we have done on this issue. I will also talk about uncertainty in fair distribution algorithms. More precisely I will present two variants of the fair distribution problem. The first one involves uncertainty in the actual valuation of
the goods by the agents, depending on what is the real state of the world (out of a set of potential world states). The second variant is the sequential fair distribution problem, where there is no certainty about what will be the goods being distributed, and the decision-maker has to distribute them on the fly while they become available. |
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| responsibles | Chevaleyre |
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