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Doxastic voluntariness and doxastic freedom| old_uid | 7550 |
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| title | Doxastic voluntariness and doxastic freedom |
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| start_date | 2009/11/06 |
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| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | We tend to appraise doxastic states, or their subjects, in terms that are broadly deontological. According to a simple argument, such appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. Several philosophers have responded to this argument by claiming that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary. In this paper I argue for the following claims. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any sense that could help support epistemic deontology. However, epistemic deontology does not require doxastic voluntariness. Rather, it requires a certain kind of doxastic freedom. We possess this doxastic freedom: our doxastic states are free, but not voluntary. Our doxastic freedom is relative to a certain perspective, namely the perspective that we adopt when we constitute our doxastic states from the inside by inquiring into how the world is. When we reflect on our states from the outside, we lack doxastic freedom. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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