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Is consciousness modal?| old_uid | 7596 |
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| title | Is consciousness modal? |
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| start_date | 2009/11/13 |
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| schedule | 10h-12h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | rdc |
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| summary | The view that conscious experiences have some kind of content is widely accepted. It is accepted by all proponents of representationalism, and also by proponents of disjunctivism as far as veridical experiences go. In this paper I ask whether something else than an experience's content plays a role in determining its phenomenal character. I will discuss examples which have sometimes
been taken to show that modalities affect phenomenal character. Then I will raise a principled difficulty with this view. The problem
arises from multimodal experiences, which are experience involving more than one modality. While I focus on the case of modalities,
variations on the problem of multimodal experiences suggest that an experience's phenomenal character is entirely determined by its content, in that no two experiences with the same content can have the same phenomenal character. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Tiziana + |
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