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Conditional Propositions| old_uid | 7706 |
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| title | Conditional Propositions |
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| start_date | 2009/11/27 |
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| schedule | 16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | rdc |
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| summary | I contrast two views about the meaning of indicative conditionals: on one view, they express propositions and are thus true or false depending on the state of the world, on the other view, they only express constraints on states of belief and thus are not truth-apt in a straightforward way. One argument for the second view comes from David Lewis's "triviality" theorems. These results depend on the assumption ("Adams' Thesis") that the probability of a conditional is equal to the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The main part of my talk will be concerned with showing that a standard propositionalist view of conditionals can capture Adams' thesis in a natural way, without falling prey to Lewis's worries. I will also explore the possibility that the propositionalist view can explain a counterexample to Adams' thesis due to Vann McGee. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Tiziana + |
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