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The economic routines of bounded machiavellians| old_uid | 7718 |
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| title | The economic routines of bounded machiavellians |
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| start_date | 2009/11/27 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In my talk, I will analyse the alternative explanations for the cultural diversity of economic prosocial behaviour and the theories on which they are grounded. The main explanation that has been put forward in the recent works of Fehr, Gächter, Henrich and others appeals to variations in social preferences. Against this view, I will defend the hypothesis that variations in prosocial behaviour as observed in experimental games are due to differences in learned economic behavioural routines, exploiting and adapted to the specifics of the local institutions. According to this hypothesis, the social preferences are in fact relatively similar across cultures; the variation is due to differences in the learned solutions, which can take the form of ‘rules of thumb’, to common economic or strategic problems and their specific cultural forms. |
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| responsibles | Nicoglou, Viciana |
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