|
Children's Understanding of Perception| old_uid | 8495 |
|---|
| title | Children's Understanding of Perception |
|---|
| start_date | 2010/04/02 |
|---|
| schedule | 11h-13h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| details | Dans le cadre du Philosophy of Language and Mind Seminar |
|---|
| summary | The development of children's understanding of perception has been tested using experimental paradigms which involve asking children about the way things look. The results of these experiments have been standardly interpreted as evidence for children's acquisition, at around the age of four, of a representational theory of perception. It is children's knowledge of this representational theory which is supposed to explain their understanding of the difference between appearance and reality, and their ability to understand others' perceptual perspectives on the world. I argue that this standard interpretation is not supported by the evidence provided by the experiments, and that a number of different elements of children's understanding have been confounded. I distinguish these different elements, and argue that we have no reason to think that children understand perception as either representational or causal. |
|---|
| responsibles | Spector, Tiziana + |
|---|
| |
|