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Making sense of truth-values: Frege in mysterious circumstances| old_uid | 8707 |
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| title | Making sense of truth-values: Frege in mysterious circumstances |
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| start_date | 2010/05/17 |
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| schedule | 17h30-19h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | On the first day of a modern course in logic one learns that the truth-value of a true propostion (or wff) is T and that of a false proposition (or wff) is F. The truth-values are explained in terms of propositional truth and falsity. Frege's way of proceeding is radically opposite; he attempts to explain truth and falisty for propositions in terms of his truth value das Wahre and das Falsche. The Fregean truth-values are not the booleans of today.
Frege's different accounts of sense - all seven of them - from the period around 1890 are briefly examined and particular attention is given to the accounts in terms of truth-values. A crucial mistranslation in (almost) all Euroepan translations of Über Sinn und Bedetung is noted and commented upon. In this connection Frege's treatment of truth-values in terms of circumstances is questioned. Finally, a purely technical reason for the introduction of truth-values is suggested. Frege's formalization of Dedekind's theorem of definition by recursion draws in Grundgesetze draws upon the notion of ordered pair, as one would expect, but in order to make sense, Frege's treatment of ordered pairs needs objectual Bedeutungen for sentences. |
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| responsibles | Pataut, Dubucs, Panza |
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