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Cognition : just how anti-cartesian is It| old_uid | 8873 |
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| title | Cognition : just how anti-cartesian is It |
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| start_date | 2010/06/09 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle F005 |
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| summary | Recent work in cognitive science has emphasized the ways in which cognitive processes are (i) embodied, (ii) embedded, (iii) enacted, and (iv) extended. This is sometimes called the 4e conception of cognition. Often, these four strands embodiment, embeddedness, enactedness, and extendedness are run together, as if they were simply variants on a single theme: a rejection of a Cartesian conception of cognitive science (CCS). However, these strands are, in fact, very different. Moreover, each strand is multiply ambiguous. It is not true that all of them are committed to rejecting CCS. Moreover, those that are committed to rejecting CCS are committed to this in different ways and for different reasons. In this paper, I shall examine and distinguish the different strands making up the 4e conception of cognition. I shall argue that if we are seeking to reject CCS, then the ideas of embodiment and extendedness are the most significant ones. |
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| oncancel | Ajout, maj le 8 juin 2010 |
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| responsibles | Roy |
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