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Art and Intentionality| old_uid | 8943 |
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| title | Art and Intentionality |
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| start_date | 2010/06/18 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Intentionality is a mark of the mental, Brentano noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality which, informally put, is the feature of being about something which may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Sensory experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality in the ways it possesses intentionality. We generalize the sensory exemplar, as Hume noted, and that simple step of generalization, no matter how automatic, exhibits, at the same time, what the intentional object is like and what our conception of it is like. The exemplar is Janus-faced looking in one direction outward toward the object represented and in the other direction inward toward the conception of it. Wittgenstein remarked that the form of representation cannot be described, it only be shown. It is the artwork that shows us the form of representation and intentionality. We begin with automatic ostensive generalization of the sensory exemplar. We end with autonomous interpretation of it. Our experience of the artwork, focusing attention of the sensory, solves the problem of representation and intentionality. It shows us how we are connected with our world. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Tiziana + |
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