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Truth and Probability| old_uid | 9049 |
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| title | Truth and Probability |
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| start_date | 2010/09/14 |
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| schedule | 17h-18h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle des Résistants |
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| details | Conférences Sigma |
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| summary | In many areas of philosophy and science we seem to be torn between concepts, properties and states of two kinds: on the one hand qualitative ones, such as truth, dispositions, beliefs, and on the other hand quantitative ones, such as chances, propensities, degrees of belief. While the formal properties of the former derive from the logical properties of truth, the formal properties of the latter are probabilistic in nature. Since it seems too costly to dismiss either of the two families as dispensable, we need to develop theories by which we can relate them to each other in ways that are systematic, coherent, and precise. The three lectures in this lecture series aim to make some progress in that direction. The first lecture tries to do to the norms of rational degrees of belief what we standardly do to the norms of rational binary belief: to give them an epistemic justification based on considerations on truth. In the second lecture we will explore a truth-conditional semantics for counterfactual conditionals in which conditional chances become the truthmakers of counterfactuals. Finally, the third lecture will present a theory of belief according to which binary belief is indeed reducible to subjective probabilities, but without the concept of binary belief being therefore eliminable from philosophical or scientific discourse. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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