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An integrative explanation of delusion| old_uid | 9058 |
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| title | An integrative explanation of delusion |
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| start_date | 2010/09/17 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Delusional subjects who are capable of rational belief fixation in some contexts seem unable to submit their delusions to rational evaluation, even in cases where they show insight into its implausibility.
This odd partitioning of delusional beliefs has led to them being described as rational, irrational, arational. As beliefs, imaginary states self-ascribed as beliefs, sui generis propositional attitudes. One problem with these all these psychological accounts is linking theme to the cognitive neuroscience of delusion. We have neural and cognitive correlates of delusion but no satisfactory multilevel explanation, which integrates them with the phenomenology and psychology.
At present there do seem to be clear candidates for neural correlates of delusion: Abnormalities of dopamine regulation, lack of the normal anticorrelation between ventromedial and dorsolateral processing and right lateral hypofrontality. However we do not understand their role in producing delusion because we do not know how they influence the cognitive processes involved in delusion formation.
This requires what Craver calls a theoretical definition. A description of systemic functioning that captures the relationships between mechanisms which play their roles different levels within a system. Theoretical definitions are proposed by philosophers of science who think of causal explanation as enabling manipulation and intervention. In multilevel systems causal explanation requires us to show how intervening at one level produces effects at another. Whatever metaphysical value of this account of causation the related idea of theoretical definition has an essential to play in integrative explanation of the mind.
I propose a theoretical definition of delusion as
The monopoly of mental time travel * by hypersalient * experiences
and defend it on the grounds that it is faithful to the psychology, accurately captures the cognitive architecture which subserves delusional thought and makes transparent the role of neural correlates. It is a better theoretical definition than others which import normative notions of rationality into the characterization of delusion.
* Mental time travel: the integration of autobiographical memory and imagination as part of decision making. Recent evidence suggests that MTT is the default mode of human cognition and is anticorrelated with abstract reasoning.
* Salience: a representation which attracts cognitive processing resources, e.g. by focusing attention, is salient. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Lesguillons, Tiziana + |
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