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Egocentric judgements, encyclopaedic beliefs, and delusional assertions| old_uid | 9249 |
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| title | Egocentric judgements, encyclopaedic beliefs, and delusional assertions |
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| start_date | 2010/11/15 |
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| schedule | 15h-17h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Capgras delusion is often, rather ambiguously as we shall see, described as the delusion that "a loved one has been replaced by an impostor".
Patients suffering from this (in cases caused by brain-damage, which do not occur in the context of schizophrenia) don't necessarily exhibit any overall reasoning deficit, and when kept away from the so-called impostor, have been known to lead ordinary lives. Any theory of belief has to explain how this delusion, which is highly tenacious, can be maintained among a set of conflicting beliefs within the mind of a seemingly rational subject. Some have held that such delusions exhibit a functional role that is so different from that exhibited by beliefs that it forces us to claim that they are not really beliefs (Currie 2000, Currie and Jureidini 2001, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Egan 2009). I think this is too quick. Here I present an overlooked distinction between encyclopaedic beliefs and egocentric judgements. Such a distinction contributes to a better understanding of Capgras delusion, and one on the basis of which it is genuinely doxastic. While encyclopaedic beliefs are reportable and context independent, egocentric judgements have context-dependent singular content involving perceived elements of one's surroundings. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Lesguillons, Tiziana + |
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