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Arguments For the Phenomenology of Thought| old_uid | 9391 |
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| title | Arguments For the Phenomenology of Thought |
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| start_date | 2010/12/09 |
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| schedule | 15h-17h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | DEC Seminar Room |
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| summary | In this talk, I shall review and analyze three classes of arguments for the phenomenology of thought: 1) epistemological arguments, 2) phenomenal contrast arguments, and 3) new phenomenal contrast arguments. I shall argue that epistemological arguments and phenomenal contrast arguments do not satisfactorily prove the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of thought, but only that of an associated phenomenology of thought. I shall argue that new phenomenal contrast arguments, relying on the principle of cognitive-phenomenological infiltration, do prove the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of thought, even if that phenomenology is not always manifest in experience and clear-cut examples of it cannot always be adduced. I shall end by evaluating how the three classes of arguments fare with respect to the issue of the order of priority between understanding/producing and phenomenology, which, if inserted into the logical space of Phenomenology of Thought theses, leads to at least four positions on the phenomenology of thought: sui generis phenomenology of thought first, associated phenomenology of thought first, sui generis phenomenology of thought second, associated phenomenology of thought second. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Tiziana + |
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