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A methodologically naturalistic perspective on natural kinds and concepts| old_uid | 9454 |
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| title | A methodologically naturalistic perspective on natural kinds and concepts |
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| start_date | 2010/12/16 |
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| schedule | 18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Developing accounts of natural kinds and of concepts is usually seen as a metaphysical task, which aims at laying out what entities in nature natural kinds are and what mental entities concepts are. In contrast, I argue that philosophical accounts of natural kinds and of concepts are epistemological endeavors, investigating human practice. Philosophers have to study why and how scientists address natural kinds in their theorizing and scientific practice, and an account of natural kinds has to be defended in these epistemological terms. A theory of concepts is adequate to the extent of which it can epistemologically explain how concepts support successful intellectual practice and how concepts can rationally change. I illustrate this with laying out my accounts of natural kinds and of concepts. My position stems from a version of methodological naturalism, which conceives of philosophical concepts (e.g., ‘natural kind’, ‘concept’) in analogy to scientific concepts as tools that are used for certain intellectual purposes, and to be defended in terms of their fruitfulness at fulfilling this purpose. This methodological naturalism provides a better philosophical method to develop philosophical concepts and defend philosophical accounts than the traditional use of intuitions (known as ‘conceptual analysis’). |
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| responsibles | Kostyrka, Laplane |
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