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Philosophie de la physique et des systèmes complexes| old_uid | 9486 |
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| title | Philosophie de la physique et des systèmes complexes |
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| start_date | 2011/01/07 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Given certain well-known observations by Mach and Russell it seems unlikely that there is a place for causation in the physical world. My aim in this paper is to understand under what conditions we can use causal terminology and how it fits in with what physics has to say. I will argue for a disposition-based process-theory of causation. After addressing Mach’s and Russell’s concerns I will start by outlining the kind of problem the disposition-based process theory of causation is meant to solve. In a second step I will discuss the nature of those dispositions that will be relevant for our question. I will then discuss existing dispositional accounts of causation before I proceed to present my own account and contrast it with traditional process theories. |
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| responsibles | Drouet, Martin |
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