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A tense problem for relativism about future contingents| old_uid | 9586 |
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| title | A tense problem for relativism about future contingents |
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| start_date | 2011/01/28 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| details | with Anandi Hattiangadi |
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| summary | John MacFarlane has recently argued that truth-relativism can solve the problem posed by future contingents. He claims that his truth-relativistic account makes the best sense of the intuitions that underpin some of our pre-theoretic judgements concerning the truth-values of statements about the future and their retrospective assessments. This paper argues that this is not the case. Contrary to what MacFarlane claims, truth-relativism doesn’t make good sense of these intuitions. The paper also offers a different approach to the problem of future contingents which does make good sense of them. |
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| responsibles | Spector, Lesguillons, Tiziana + |
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