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Why are we certain that we exist? Cotard delusion and the cogito| old_uid | 9611 |
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| title | Why are we certain that we exist? Cotard delusion and the cogito |
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| start_date | 2011/02/04 |
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| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. At least prima facie, most of us are more certain that they think and exist than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain, and the kind of thoughts on which this certainty bears. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito and they disagree both on the kind of thoughts on which it bears and on the reasons of its cogency. According to what we can call empiricist interpretations of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations on the other hand, the cogito bears on some reflexive propositional attitudes, and it derives its certainty from their rational rather than from their (would-be) phenomenal features. The Cotard delusion is a rare psychiatric condition in which patients often deny that they think and that they exist. I argue that the empirical study of the Cotard delusion allows both to favor and to refine the empiricist interpretation. |
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| responsibles | Pacherie, Dokic, Proust |
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