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Causation in perspective. Reflections on the perspective-relativity of the truth value of causal judgments| old_uid | 9624 |
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| title | Causation in perspective. Reflections on the perspective-relativity of the truth value of causal judgments |
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| start_date | 2011/02/04 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that that the truth-value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e, their truth value does not depend entirely in mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper I first briefly present Menzies’ arguments. Then I investigate whether perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. In the third part of the paper I go deeper into the different ways in which the truth-value of causal claims can be perspective-relative. In the fourth part I ask whether perspective-relativity poses a thread of relativism. Finally, I sketch the metaphysical consequences of perspective-relativity. |
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| responsibles | Drouet, Martin |
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