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Towards a dual-process theory of metaperception| old_uid | 9891 |
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| title | Towards a dual-process theory of metaperception |
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| start_date | 2011/04/29 |
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| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Research on metamemory suggests that even an agent equipped with mindreading abilities, and able to grasp the limitations of her cognitive aptitudes, often relies on sentiments to monitor her cognitive activities (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). An important but rather unexplored issue is whether this is also true of perceptual metacognition, or metaperception. Do perceivers rely on two different processes, namely associative heuristics and folk-theoretical reasoning about perception, to evaluate their performance? Prima facie, one might be tempted to respond negatively to this question. The two dominant theories of metaperception do not appeal to such a dual-process framework. According to the one, confidence judgments are based on a direct, automatic “read-out” of the probabilistic information present in the perceptual system (Kersten et al., 2004; Barthelmé & Mamassian, 2010). According to the other, confidence judgments are based on an analytic reasoning about perception (Levin, ed. 2004). However, neither of them offers an adequate explanation of both i) the good calibration reported in second-order psychophysical tasks, and ii) of metaperceptual biases, such as the one manifested in the Change Blindness Blindness phenomenon (Levin et al., 2000). The former theory accounts for the generally good calibration of metaperceptual judgments, but fails to account for metaperceptual biases, and vice versa. I argue that to face this twofold challenge, one might need to consider the possibility that metaperception has a dual-basis, and take into account the influence exercised by activity-dependent cues on metaperceptual judgments. To test these hypotheses at the empirical level, one should study how perceivers learn to calibrate their metaperceptual judgments to the feedback received from perceptual activities. I report an experimental study that has been exploring the dynamics of metaperceptual calibration, using the Change Blindness Blindness paradigm, which supported these assumptions. Finally, I discuss the relations between these two putative processes underlying metaperceptual judgments. |
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| responsibles | Pacherie, Dokic, Proust |
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