Levels, Groups and Mechanistic Explanation

old_uid9900
titleLevels, Groups and Mechanistic Explanation
start_date2011/05/02
schedule17h30-19h30
onlineno
location_info3e étage, salle 405
summaryAppeals to levels of explanation work well as a strategy in cases where our concern is with processes going on within a system. We bet  that processes at one level realize or constitute processes at other levels. But in many cases we need to relate different sorts of causal processes where that bet is not plausible, especially in cases where explanations combine environmental factors with others that unfold within an organism. I shall argue that for most cases in the cognitive and (especially) social sciences levels talk is probably not much use, and look at some alternative ways of thinking, including appeals to mechanist and to manipulationist theories.
oncancelchangement de salle et d’horaire
responsiblesKostyrka, Laplane