|
Predication and the Content-Force Distinction| old_uid | 10968 |
|---|
| title | Predication and the Content-Force Distinction |
|---|
| start_date | 2012/03/06 |
|---|
| schedule | 16h30-18h30 |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| summary | Here I focus on the act of predication. Predication, as I understand
it, is a type of action a subject performs when she attributes a property to an
object, where this commits the subject to the object’s having the property.
Conceiving of predication in this way, and including it in propositions,
amounts to a rejection of Frege’s content-force distinction and a rejection of
Frege’s conception of judgment and assertion. My aim in this talk is to
motivate my approach over Frege’s. I also contrast my account of propositions
with the one given by Scott Soames in his recent book What is Meaning? |
|---|
| responsibles | Murez, Hanks |
|---|
| |
|